Abstract. At Eurocrypt 2010, Freeman proposed a transformation from pairing-based schemes in composite-order bilinear groups to equivalent ones in prime-order bilinear groups. His transformation can be applied to pairing-based cryptosystems exploiting only one of two properties of composite-order bilinear groups: cancelling and projecting. At Asiacrypt 2010, Meiklejohn, Shacham, and Freeman showed that prime-order bilinear groups according to Freeman's construction cannot have two properties simultaneously except negligible probability and, as an instance of implausible conversion, proposed a (partially) blind signature scheme whose security proof exploits both the cancelling and projecting properties of composite-order bilinear groups.
Introduction
Since Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [11] introduced composite-order bilinear groups in 2005, they have been used to solve many challenging problems in cryptography. Cryptographic systems using composite-order bilinear groups mostly utilize one of two properties, called cancelling and projecting, which Freeman [18] identified. (Though Freeman named two properties recently, these properties were already used before.) The security of almost all crypto systems using composite-order bilinear groups is based on the subgroup decision assumption, introduced by Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [11] , or its variants.
Recently, some literature has aimed at constructing mathematical structures using prime-order bilinear groups with properties similar to (or richer than) composite-order bilinear groups [33, 25, 18, 20] . In particular, Freeman [18] proposed two product groups of prime-order bilinear groups with separately defined bilinear maps. He showed that two proposed product groups satisfy the subgroup decision assumption (in the sense that given g, it is infeasible to determine whether g is in a subgroup or the whole product group), and each product group with a bilinear map satisfies cancelling and projecting, respectively. One direct benefit of this approach is efficiency improvements of group operations and pairing computations. Loosely speaking, in bilinear groups of composite order, the group order N must be infeasible to factor so that group operations and pairing computations are less efficient than those of bilinear groups of prime order for the same security level. See [18, 20] for detailed efficiency comparison between composite-order groups and prime-order groups.
On the other hand, Meiklejohn, Shacham, and Freeman [31] gave a negative result, that is, an evidence of the limitation of constructing in some class of bilinear groups with both the cancelling and projecting properties, which is constructed on prime-order bilinear groups. To impart meaning to their result, they also proposed a round optimal blind signature scheme in composite-order bilinear groups whose security proof exploits both the cancelling and projecting properties of the composite-order bilinear group. 1 Their round optimal blind signature scheme is of independent interest since it is the first practical scheme of this type based on static assumptions (not based on q-type assumptions) in the common reference string model. They left two open questions: (1) whether the instantiation in prime-order groups of their round optimal blind signature scheme is provably secure or insecure, and (2) whether their limitation result can be applied to a wider class of bilinear groups constructed from prime-order groups.
In this paper, we answer both questions. We propose a (partially) blind signature scheme in a prime-order bilinear group setting. The proposed scheme can be considered as an adapted version of the scheme in [31] to the prime-order group setting. However, we prove the one-more unforgeability of the proposed scheme by using a completely different strategy from [31] . Our proof does not require the cancelling property, and instead we use another property, that we call translating, on prime order groups. Informally, the translating property is that given g 1 , g a 1 ∈ G 1 , g 2 ∈ G 2 , where G 1 and G 2 are distinct subgroups of G, there exists a map T outputting g a 2 . The translating property is used, in an essential way, to prove the one-more unforgeability of the proposed scheme. With this proof, we obtain a round optimal (partially) blind signature scheme (without relying on the random oracle heuristic) based on the decisional linear assumption in the common reference string model, which is of independent interest. Our blind signature scheme is more efficient than [31] . For example, our scheme has a shorter signature size (six elements in the prime-order group vs. two elements in the composite-order group). Moreover, the security of our blind signature scheme does not rely on the factoring assumption. (The blindness of the signature scheme in [31] based on the subgroup hiding assumption, which requires that the factorization of group order N is infeasible.)
As the second contribution, we show that there exists a more general class of bilinear groups than Meiklejohn, Shacham, and Freeman considered, and some of theses can be both cancelling and projecting. That is, we take a rank n Z p -submodule of Z n 2 p , instead of Z n p , to be a base group G, and consider the projections into its rank 1 submodules. In this case, we should carefully consider group membership tests of a subgroup. We provide an efficient membership-checking algorithm to G, which was trivial in the previous setting, and we show that the subgroup decision assumption on this base group G holds in the generic bilinear group model for n = 2. Consequently, it is still open as to whether there exists a cryptosystem on composite-order bilinear groups that cannot be constructed on prime-order bilinear groups.
We note that although we construct a structure satisfying both cancelling and projecting, our construction can not be applied directly to the scheme in [31] to transform it to prime-order setting. The proof of [31] uses a property of composite-order group such that two subgroups' order are relatively prime, and our construction does not support such property so that we could not apply our construction to the round optimal blind signature scheme in [31] .
Related Work: Blind Signatures. Since Chaum [12, 13] introduced the concept of blind signatures in 1982, it has been studied extensively [6, 1, 7, 8, 17, 29, 32, 26, 5, 19, 4, 2, 22, 31, 3, 21] because of its numerous applications, such as electronic voting [14] and electronic cash [15] . Blind signatures are interactive protocols between a user and a signer. In blind signatures, informally, the user can obtain a signature (signed by the signer) on a message (chosen by the user) without revealing the message to the signer that is signed during the protocol; that is, the signer learns nothing about the message after finishing the protocol.
In particular, round optimal (i.e., 2-move) blind signature schemes have received attention since the round complexity is an important measurement of efficiency in the computer network, and round optimal blind signature schemes directly imply that they are concurrently secure. In the random oracle model, there are elegant round optimal blind signatures by Chaum [13] and Boldyreva [8] . Without relying on the random oracle heuristic, there is an approach using general NIZKs for NP, and its security depends on the assumption that a common reference string exists [17, 5] . Very recently, Garg et al. proposed the first round optimal blind signature in the standard model (without random oracle and a setup assumption such as a common reference string) [21] . These approaches without random oracle, however, are not as efficient as an approach, in which we are interested, using a bilinear map [10, 11] .
In recent years several efficient round optimal blind signatures [19, 4, 2, 31, 3] have been proposed in the common reference string model, using a bilinear map, by combining signature schemes with efficient NIWI proofs [24, 23, 25] . These approaches using a bilinear map either rely on q-type dynamic assumptions [19, 4, 2, 3] or working on the composite-order group [31] . Though there is an analysis of a family of q-type dynamic assumptions by Cheon [16] , the security of q-type assumptions still remains obscure. (q-type assumptions used in the above schemes hold in the generic group model [36] and these can be strong evidence for believing such assumptions. However, we believe that as the next step, constructing schemes without relying on such strong assumptions is an encouraging research approach.) In [31] , a round optimal blind signature scheme based on static assumptions (not on q-type assumptions) using composite-order groups is proposed.
Notations and Definitions
Throughout this paper, we use notation ⊕ for the internal direct product: for an abelian group G, we write G = G 1 ⊕ G 2 when G 1 and G 2 are subgroups of G and G 1 ∩ G 2 = {1 G } for the identity 1 G of G. In this case, every element g in G can be uniquely written by g = g 1 · g 2 for some g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 , where · is a group operation in G, and will be omitted sometimes. We use notation x 1. G ⊂ ker(π), H ⊂ ker(π), and G t ⊂ ker(π t ). 2. π t (e(g, h)) = e(π(g),π(h)) for ∀g ∈ G and ∀h ∈ H.
If G is a symmetric bilinear group generator, that is, G = H, then set G = H and π =π.
To prove the security of the proposed blind signature scheme, we need two widely-known assumptions, the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, and k-Linear assumption which is introduced by Hofheinz and Kiltz and Shacham [27, 35] , in the bilinear group setting.
Definition 5 Let G 1 be a bilinear group generator of prime order. We define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G, denoted by Adv
, is to be
We say that G satisfies the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in G if for any PPT algorithm A, Adv
is a negligible function of λ.
Definition 6 Let G 1 be a bilinear group generator of prime order and k ≥ 1. We define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the k-Linear problem in G, denoted by Adv
Then, we say that G satisfies the k-Linear assumption in G if for any PPT algorithm A, the advantage of A Adv
We can analogously define the CDH assumption and the k-Linear assumption in H. The 1-Linear assumption in G is the DDH assumption in G and the 2-Linear assumption in G is the decisional linear assumption in G.
Next, we provide the definition of the subgroup decision assumption, adapted from [18] to fit our purpose.
Definition 7 Let G be a bilinear group generator. We define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the (n, k)-subgroup decision problem on the left, denoted by Adv
We say that G satisfies the (n, k)-subgroup decision assumption on the left if for any PPT algorithm A, its advantage Adv
is a negligible function in λ.
2 The non-triviality does not appear in the original definition [18] . Without this, however, every bilinear group can be projecting by using the trivial homomorphisms.
We analogously define the (n, k)-subgroup decision assumption on the right.
Definition 8
We say that a bilinear group generator G(·, ·) satisfies the (n, k)-subgroup decision assumption if G(·, n) satisfies both the (n, k)-subgroup decision assumptions on the left and on the right.
We will often omit (n, k) term, if it is clear in the context.
3 Round-Optimal Blind Signature in Prime-Order group
Symmetric Bilinear Group with Projecting Pairing
We construct a symmetric bilinear group generator with the projecting property. (The symmetric bilinear groups mean that G = H, and G i = H i in our definition of bilinear groups.) We borrow some notations from Freeman's paper [18] . Let G be a group, g, g 1 , · · · , g n be elements in G, − → α = (a 1 , · · · , a n ) be a vector in Z n p , and M = (m ij ) be an n × n matrix. We denote g
). We can see that (g
. We newly define some notations useful to explain product groups. Let G = ⊕ i∈ [1,n] G i and H = ⊕ j∈ [1,n] H j , where G i and H j are cyclic groups of same order. Let e(G i , H j ) be a set {e(g i , h j )|g i ∈ G i , h j ∈ H j }; hence e(G i , H j ) is a cyclic group since G i and H j are cyclic groups. In particular, when G i and H j have prime order p, e(G i , H j ) is a cyclic group of order p or 1. Now, we construct a symmetric bilinear group generator G SP (λ, 3), which is a generalization of Groth and Sahai's instantiation based on the decisional linear assumption [25] , and is also a symmetric version of Freeman's asymmetric bilinear group generator with the projecting property [18] .
p , and set
, where ⊗ is a tensor product (Kronecker product) of two
where M is a 3 × 3 matrix having − → x i as its i-th row, U i is a 3 × 3 matrix with 1 in the (i, i) entry and zeroes elsewhere, and ⊗ is a tensor product of matrices: For 1 × 2 matrix A = (a i,j ) and 3 × 4 matrix B = (b i,j ), A ⊗ B is a 1 3 × 2 4 matrix whose (i, j)-th block is equal to a i,j B, where we consider A ⊗ B as 1 × 2 blocks. Then, π i is a projection such that for
We provide a useful lemma to understand the structure of the image of e.
Lemma 1
The image of e generated by G SP is equal to ⊕ 1≤i≤j≤3 e(G i , G j ), and each e(G i , G j )'s order is p.
We provide the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix B. Non-degeneracy of e is directly coming from the lemma 1. (That is, e(g, h) = 1 t for any non-identity elements g, h ∈ G. If not, the image is not equal to ⊕ 1≤i≤j≤3 e(G i , G j ).) The bilinear property of e can be easily checked from the bilinear property of the tensor product. Further, G SP satisfies the projecting property:
, and π t = π t,1 , where G , G t , π, and π t are defined in the definition 4. Then, G ⊂ ker(π) and G t ⊂ ker(π t ), and e, π, π t satisfy the following commutative property.
We can check this commutative property as follows:
The fifth equality comes from the property of the tensor product such as (
where A and B are matrices having columns and C and D are matrices having rows for some . (We can consider a vector as a matrix having one row.) In contrast to the composite order bilinear group, our product group of prime order group has an additional property, we name translating and define as follow.
Definition 9 A bilinear group generator G is (i, j)-translating if there exists efficiently computable (that is, polynomial time in λ) maps T i,j :
If G is a symmetric bilinear group generator, then setT i,j = T i,j . We show that the above G SP construction satisfies translating property. Proof. We first construct T 3,1 . Given g a 3 and a 3 × 3 matrix M defined as in the description of G SP , we can compute g a 1 without knowing a as follows:
Moreover, G SP satisfies (3, 2)-subgroup decision assumption when the underlying group generator G 1 satisfies the decisional linear assumption.
Lemma 2 If G 1 satisfies the decisional linear assumption, then G SP satisfies the (3, 2)-subgroup decision assumption.
We relegate the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix B.
Remark 1. Note that G SP does not satisfy the cancelling property since e(G i , G j ) is not equal to {1 t } for i = j (Lemma 1).
Construction
The abstract of our scheme looks very similar to the Meiklejohn et al.'s construction in the composite order bilinear group [31] . We slightly changed the Meiklejohn et al.'s construction to adapt in the prime order bilinear group setting.
(Partially) blind signature schemes in the common reference model consist of five (interactive) algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, User, Signer, and Verify. We provide the formal definition of (partially) blind signature schemes, and concurrently security, in Appendix A. We follow the security definition of [31] , which is slightly stronger than [6] , by allowing the adversary to choose the public key in the blindness definition. As a definition of the blind signature, [31] is modified from [28] ; (1) it strengthens the blindness game to allow the adversary to generate the public key, and (2) it weakens the one-more unforgeability game to require that the messages (instead of pairs of message and signature) must all be distinct.
3
The proposed partially blind signature scheme for a message space M = {0, 1} m is as follows. 4 :
• KeyGen(CRS):
). The public key is P K = {A}, and the secret key is SK = {g }.
• User(CRS, P K, inf o, M sg): Let inf o be an m 0 bits string and M sg be an m − m 0 bit string. We write inf o bitwise as
and compute
to the signer and save state = {(t i,1 , t i,2 )} i∈[m0+1,m] .
• Signer(CRS, SK, inf o, req): = e(h 1 , θ i,1 )e(h 2 , θ i,2 ) and e(c i u
If for some i the above equation does not hold, abort the protocol and output ⊥. Otherwise, compute
to the user, and output success and inf o.
3 This weakened definition is necessary if the output signature can be re-randomized. [31] 's partially blind signature and ours are in the case. 4 For large message spaces, we can use a collision resistance hash function first.
• User(state,
If one of two above equations is fail to hold, then abort the protocol and output ⊥. Otherwise, unblind the signature by computing
Check the validity of the signature (S 1 , S 2 ) by running Verify. If it outputs accept, then go to the next step. Otherwise, abort the protocol and output ⊥. Finally re-randomize the signature by picking a random s $ ← Z p and computing
Output the signature sig = (S 1 , S 2 ), inf o, and success.
If the above equality holds, then output accept. Otherwise, output f ail.
In the first procedure of the user, 
We provide three theorems to prove the security of the proposed (partially) blind signature scheme.
Theorem 2
The above blind signature is correct.
Theorem 3
If G 1 satisfies the decisional linear assumption, then the above blind signature satisfies blindness.
The proof of Theorem 2 and 3 are similar to the previous ones [31] . We provide the proof in Appendix C.
Theorem 4
If G 1 satisfies the the CDH assumption, then the above blind signature is one-more unforgeable.
We provide the proof of Theorem 4 in Appendix C. Now, we briefly explain our idea to prove the one-more unforgeability, and the reason why we cannot apply the Meiklejohn et al. proof strategy to the proposed scheme. At the end of the interaction, the user obtains a Waters-signature, which is existentially unforgeable based on the CDH assumption. If the user obtains only a Waters signature, then the proposed scheme is, loosely speaking, also one-more unforgeable. However, the user obtains not only a Waters signature (of the form g (u i∈ [1,m] 
for some (unknown and uniformly distributed) r ∈ Z p , and t i,1 , t i,2 , and b i chosen by itself. Therefore, we should show that h −r
2 ) r will not be helpful for the user to break the one-more unforgeability. In [31] , a pairing e satisfies the cancelling property, and orders of subgroups are relatively prime so that each part contained in each subgroup in a signature scheme is independent. [31] essentially utilized this independence. If, in our scheme, the G 1 ⊕ G 2 part and G 3 part were independent, the user could not obtain any additional information about the part in G 3 from the above information. (Since all information other than a Waters signature, which the user gets at the end of the protocol, is related to h 1 and h 2 , which are elements in G 1 ⊕G 2 , this information will not be helpful for forging the Waters signature in the G 3 part.) Hence, the one-more unforgeability of the scheme can be reduced to the existential unforgeability of the Waters signature (in G 3 in the case of our scheme). However, we cannot apply this Meiklejohn et al. proof strategy to our scheme since our bilinear map e does not have the cancelling property and each subgroup has the same order p. Instead, we prove the one-more unforgeability using a completely different strategy. Our simulation basically follows the simulation for the existential unforgeability of the Waters signature, and at the same time simulates directly additional information h −r
2 ) r since t i,1 and t i,2 are chosen by the user and r is usually not known to the simulator during the simulation. (r is usually of the form Ra + S for some unknown a and constants R and S, where a is given by the form g a .) We circumvent this obstacle by using the projecting property and the translating property mentioned in section 3.1. To simulate this additional information, the simulator first extracts the message, that is, recovers
, we can change it to be of the form h ati,j j for some unknown a by using the translating property mentioned in section 3.1 when v i contains a in the exponent. The simulator can generate
r by using h Remark 3. In the user's first procedure, the GS-commitment and proof appear to have redundant parts. It would be more natural to change them to
and it can be verified by e(c i , c i u
). This commitment and proof is GS commitment and proof for b i ∈ {0, 1}. However, we note that in this case, we could not prove the one-more unforgeability based on the CDH assumption. We only proved the one-more unforgeability based on the decisional linear assumption and augmented CDH assumption. (Augmented CDH assumption roughly says that given
it is infeasible to compute g ab .) To avoid requiring g a 2 , in the simulation, that is, to prove the one-more unforgeability based on the CDH assumption, we modified the commitment and the proof to the current form.
Bilinear Group: Both Cancelling and Projecting

Interpreting Limitation Result in [31]
In [31] , the authors consider the cases that the bilinear group generator G(λ, n) is defined as follows:
The authors showed that e can be both the cancelling and projecting only with negligible probability when e is defined as the above. In the above G construction, to generate a rank n Z p -module, G is defined as G n . In the proof for the limitation result ([31, Proposition 6.4 and Theorem 6.5]), the authors used, in an essential way, the fact that a rank n Z p -module is of the form G n . We can, however, also define, in a different way, a rank n Z p -module G. First generate a rank n (> n) Z p -moduleG, and then define G as a rank n Z p -submodule ofG. For example, defineG = G 4 and
where {(a i , b i , c i , d i )} i∈ [1, 3] is a set of linearly independent vectors in Z 4 p . Then, G is a rank 3 Z p -submodule of a rank 4 Z p -moduleG. This example is not included in the case of the above G construction. In this example, we should argue about the membership check of G since any group should be easy to check for its membership to be used for cryptographic applications. If there is no additional information, the membership check of G is infeasible since it is equivalent to the decisional 3-linear problem. However, we should not rule out this case when some additional information for membership check is given. Our construction is exactly such a case.
Our Construction
First, we give an instructive intuition of our construction. To construct a bilinear group generator with projecting, we should consider the order of image of a bilinear map, which should be larger than prime p. 5 We start from a bilinear group generator with the cancelling property [18] . We consider n different bilinear group generators (of rank n) with cancelling property. Let
We define a map e by using bilinear mapsē i defined over each
where g i ∈ G (i) and h i ∈ H (i) . This construction also satisfies the cancelling property. If we can control the basis of the image of e so that the order of image is not prime p, then we may obtain the projecting property.
For vectors
, and a group element g ∈ G, we define a notation
. Now, we describe our construction G CP . 1. Take a security parameter and a positive integer n as inputs, run G 1 , and obtain (p, G, H, G t ,ê). 2. Choose generators g and h at random from G and H, respectively.
2 generated by g Ψi , and define H i by a cyclic group in H n 2 generated by h Φi . 5. Define G and H by the internal direct product of G i 's and
6. Define a map e : G × H → G t as follows:
for any Γ = (α 11 , · · · , α nn ) and Λ = (β 11 , · · · , β nn ).
5 If the image of a bilinear map is prime p, it cannot satisfy projecting property [31] .
7. Take a basis of Ψ 1 , · · · , Ψ n ⊥ at random, say {Ψ 1 , · · · ,Ψ n 2 −n }, and take a basis of
In the description of G CP each G i and H i is defined to be rank 1, as Z p -submodules of G n 2 , and for i = j,
Therefore, in the step 5, G = ⊕ i∈ [1,n] G i and H = ⊕ i∈ [1,n] H i are well-defined and rank n Z p -submodules of G n 2 .
Cancelling, Projecting, and Translating
It is straightforward to check that e is a non-degenerate bilinear map. We show that e satisfies cancelling, projecting and translating.
be the output of the above G CP . Then, e is both cancelling and projecting.
Proof. Let X 1 , · · · , X n , Y 1 , · · · , Y n and D be generated in the step 3 of Section 4.2. These satisfy the following three conditions.
(
From the condition (1) we can see that Ψ i 's are linearly independent and Φ i 's are linearly independent and so G = ⊕ i∈ [1,n] G i and H = ⊕ i∈ [1,n] H i are well-defined. The condition (2) guarantees that e is a cancelling bilinear map:
is equal to the identity of the product group (G t )
n . The third condition (3) implies that {Ψ i • Φ i } i∈ [1,n] is a set of linearly independent vectors in Z n p ; hence, any pair of groups e(G i ,
has no common element except the identity so that Im(e) = ⊕ i∈[1,n] e(G i , H i ) = G t . We can consider natural projections π i : G → G i ,π i : H → H i , and π t,i : G t → e(G i , H i ). We can construct these projections, in a similar way as the construction of the projections in the subsection 3.1. We leave the details in Appendix D. Let G = ⊕ [2,n] 
Then, e satisfies the definition 4.
Proof. We will construct T 3,1 . We can construct other T i,j andT i,j similarly. Given g 3 , g a 3 and n × n matrices X i defined as in the description of G CP , we can compute g a 1 without knowing a as follows:
, and compute We show that anyone knowing σ can test membership of elements in G and H (membership test for G t is trivial) in Appendix D. Finally, we should show that G satisfies the subgroup decision assumption, but it is not easy to prove that G satisfies the subgroup decision for any n. Instead, in Appendix D we give a proof that, for n = 2, G satisfies the (2, 1)-subgroup decision assumption in the generic bilinear group model [36] (that is, we assume that the adversary should access the oracles for group operations of G, H, G t and pairing computations forê, where G 1 → (p, G, H, G t ,ê) ). Though we give a proof for the case n = 2, we are positive that G CP satisfies the subgroup decision assumption for n > 2. For n > 2, there are several variables, particularly in σ, we should consider for the subgroup decision assumption, so these make it hard to prove for the case n > 2, even in the generic bilinear group model. 6 
Conclusions and Further Work
In
7 Second, we showed that there exist bilinear group generators that are both cancelling and projecting in the prime-order bilinear group setting.
The proof of the Meiklejohn-Shacham-Freeman blind signature scheme, and the Lewko-Waters identitybased encryption scheme [30] essentially use the fact that orders of subgroups are relatively prime as well as the projecting and/or cancelling properties. For each scheme, the adapted version in prime-order bilinear groups is proposed, with a different security proof strategy, in this paper and [30] , respectively. It would be interesting to find a general procedure to transform such schemes using relatively prime orders in compositeorder groups to schemes in prime-order groups.
We proposed a new mathematical framework with both cancelling and projecting in a prime-order bilinear group setting, and gave the proof that the (2, 1) subgroup decision assumption holds in the generic bilinear group model when n = 2. This research leaves many interesting open problems. We ask if the subgroup decision assumption holds when n > 2, and if the subgroup decision assumption can be reduced to the simple assumption such as the (decisional) k-linear assumption. We did not find good cryptographic applications of this framework. It would be interesting to design cryptographic schemes based on the proposed framework. We expect that this research will provide other directions for our primitive question: whether there exists a cryptosystem on composite-order bilinear groups that cannot be constructed on prime-order bilinear groups. 
A Definition of Blind Signatures
In this section, we recall the definition of partially blind signature from [31] . We assume that both signer and user agree on the common information, denoted as inf o, and inf o is decided outside of the partially blind signature scheme. In some applications, inf o is may be decided by the signer, or the user. In our definition of the (concurrently secure) partially blind signature, we want the signature scheme to be secure regardless of the process of deciding inf o.
Definition 10 A partially blind signature in the common reference string (CRS) model is a collection of five (interactive) algorithms.
• Setup is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter λ and outputs a common reference string, denoted as CRS.
• KeyGen is a PPT algorithm, on input CRS, outputs a public and secret key pair (P K, SK).
• Signer and User are PPT (interactive) algorithms. Signer takes CRS, SK and inf o as input, and User takes CRS, P K, inf o, and a message M sg ∈ {0, 1} m as input. At the end of interaction, if the interaction is successful, then Signer outputs 'success', and User outputs 'success' and the unblinded signature 'sig'.
• Verify is a (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithm that takes (CRS, P K, inf o, M sg, sig) and outputs either 'accept' or 'f ail'.
Definition 11
We say that a partially blind signature scheme (in the CRS model) is concurrently secure if for all PPT algorithm A there exists a negligible function η(·) and a security parameter λ 0 such that for all λ > λ 0 the following three properties hold: The signature scheme is considered blind if the probability that b = b is at most 1 2 + η(λ), where the probability goes over the choices of b, the randomness used in Setup, and the randomness used by A and users. 3. One-more unforgeability: Define the following game for the adversary A (roll of a user).
(a) CRS
(c) A, on input CRS and P K, engages in poly(λ) arbitrarily interleaved executions of the signing protocol with polynomially many copies of Signer(CRS, SK, inf o), where inf o is sent by A, (on and messages of its choice). Let q inf o denote the number of executions in which for a common input inf o the signer outputs success at the end. For inf o that have never sent to the signer, define q inf o = 0. (For inf o =⊥ (that is, m inf o = 0), q inf o is defined in the same manner.) (d) For some inf o, A outputs a collection of message-signature pairs {(M sg i , sig i )} i∈ [1,q ] such that M sg i = M sg j for all i = j, and Verify(CRS, P K, inf o, M sg i , sig i ) = success for all i ∈ [1, q ]. We say that the signature scheme is one-more unforgeable if the probability that q > q inf o is at most η(λ), where the probability is taken over the randomness used in Setup, KeyGen, A and Signer.
B Proof of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. We define notation: For subgroups S 1 , · · · , S n of an abelian group S with group operator ·, let i∈[1,n] S i be a subgroup {s 1 · · · s n |s i ∈ S i for ∀i ∈ [1, n]}.
From the bilinearity of e, the image of e is equal to 1≤i≤j≤3 e(G i , G j ).
p is sufficient to prove the lemma. Suppose that for 1
linear dependent. Then, there exists a ij ∈ Z p for i, j ∈ [1, 3] such that i,j∈ [1, 3] a ij ( − → x i ⊗ − → x j ) = 0 and a ij 's are not all zero. Let − → x j be i∈ [1, 3] 
is a non-zero vector since a ij 's are not all zero, and − → x 1 , − → x 2 and − → x 3 are linearly independent. Without loss of generality, we assume that − → x 1 is a non-zero vector, and the first entry of − → x 1 is non-zero. From the first three entries of j∈ [1, 3] − → x j ⊗ − → x j , we obtain an equation
, where x j1 is the first entry of − → x j . Since x 11 = 0, it is a contradiction to the linearly independency of − → x 1 , − → x 2 and − → x 3 .
is mutually disjoint (except the identity) to the other subgroup.
Therefore, the image of e is equal to ⊕ 1≤i≤j≤3 e(G i , G j ).
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that there exist an algorithm A to break the subgroup decision assumption of G SP . We construct an algorithm B to attack the decisional linear assumption of G 1 by using A. First, B is given the decisional linear problem (p, G, G t , e, g, g
The goal of B is to determine ) and sendg along with the group description to A. Finally, B receives A's result and outputs it as his result. If z = z 3 + z 4 , theng is uniformly distributed in h 1 , h 2 = G 1 ⊕ G 2 , and otherwise,g is uniformly distributed in G. Therefore, B can attack the subgroup decision assumption with the same advantage as A's advantage to solve the decisional linear problem.
C Proof of Theorems
C.1 Proof of Theorem 2
We show that the correctness of the proposed blind signature in the section 3.2. If the user correctly constructs c i , − → θ i in the first procedure, then they will pass the signer's test since
2 )e(h ti,1
Further, if the signer correctly follows the protocol,
1 , and K 3,2 = h −r 2 . They will pass the user's test in the second procedure since e(K 3,1 , g) = e(h −r 1 , g) = e(h 1 , K 2 ) and e(K 3,2 , g) = e(h −r 2 , g) = e(K 2 , g).
Finally, the user outputs a signature as
which is a valid signature with the randomness r + s.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 3
We show that if G 1 satisfies the decisional linear assumption, then the proposed blind signature satisfies the blindness definition. We prove the theorem by using hybrid arguments. First, we define a sequence of games. The only different part between adjacent games is the distribution of CRS. For i ∈ [0, m], Game i : Group description in CRS is equal to the real game, that is, p, G, G t , e are normally generated. Generate g, u
Then, normally follow the game procedure.
Game 0 is equal to the real game, and in Game m all u i and v i are randomly chosen from G 1 ⊕ G 2 . By Lemma 2, any polynomial time algorithm has negligibly different advantage between Game i and Game i , and between Game i and Game i+1 . Then, the triangle inequality law implies the following lemma. Next, we will show that any algorithm cannot obtain any information about the user's message in Game m . That is, we will prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Any (unbounded) algorithm has no advantage in Game m .
From the above two lemmas, we can complete the proof of theorem. Now, we prove the lemma 4. In the game of blindness, the only chances that the adversary can obtain information about each user's message are (1) the user's commitment to the message and its proof, (2) the user's response, that is, whether the user accepts the adversary's output (K 1 , K 2 , K 3,1 , K 3,2 ), and (3), the user's output signature. Now,we show that no adversary can obtain any information from the three aforementioned resources in Game m even for the unbounded adversary.
The user's commitment to the message and its proof. We used GS-commitment and proof so that in Game m each user's commitment and proof identically distribute regardless of their witness. (Game m is a witness indistinguishable setting of GS-proof.) More precisely, the distribution of c i , d i , θ i,1 , θ i,2 , θ i,3 and θ i,4 when b i = 0, is identical to the distribution when b i = 1. Further, all tuple of (c i , d i , θ i,1 , θ i,2 , θ i,3 , θ i,4 ) for i ∈ [m 0 + 1, m] are independent. Therefore, the adversary cannot obtain any information about the message from the user's commitment to the message and its proof. Let us explain the detail.
When b i = 0,
where t i,1 , t i,2 , s i,1 , s i,2 , r i and r i are uniformly and independently distributed in Z p . When b i = 1,
where t i,1 , t i,2 , s i,1 , s i,2 , r i and r i are uniformly and independently distributed in Z p . Let Then,t i,1 ,t i,2 ,s i,1 ,s i,2 ,r i andr i are uniformly and independently distributed in Z p , and
and hence the distribution when b i = 1 is identical to the distribution when b i = 0. 
the other one is Verfy(CRS, P K, M, (S 1 , S 2 )), where
3,2 ) and S 2 = K 2 , and t i,1 and t i,2 are used in the commitment c i and its proof θ i,1 and θ i,2 . We will show that the adversary can perform these two types of test by himself so that the adversary cannot obtain any information from the user's response. The adversary can trivially check the first type of test by himself. Now, we consider the user's second test Verfy(CRS, P K, M sg, (S 1 , S 2 )).
The adversary can see whether the fourth equality holds or not, from the first test. Since the user performs the second test only if the first test are passed, the adversary can check by testing the first test and testing A ? = e(K 1 , g)e(K 2 , u ( i∈ [1,m0] The user's output signature. The output signature of each user is re-randomized so that the randomness uniformly distributes. Therefore the adversary cannot obtain any information about the underlying message from two signatures.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 4
We show that if G 1 satisfies the the CDH assumption, then the proposed blind signature is one-more unforgeable (in the sense of the one-more unforgeability definition in Appendix A).
Suppose that there exists a polynomial algorithm A to break the one-more unforgeable property in the game defined in Appendix A, with success probability. Let q inf o be the number of signing queries for the common information inf o, and let q be the sum of q inf o for all inf o issued by A. Let be the success probability of A in the one-more unforgeability game. We construct an algorithm B to attack the CDH assumption by using A, with more than 8(m+1)q success probability so that we prove there is no such polynomial time adversary A to break the one-more unforgeable property in the sense of the definition in Appendix A.
B starts with receiving (p, G, G t , e, g, g a , g b ). The goal of B is to compute g ab .
Setup. B first generates CRS of the blind signature. B sets an integer, = 4q, chooses a random integer k
These functions are not used in the setup phase, however, they will be used to simulate Waters-signature in the signing oracle phase and to extract g ab from the adversary's output.
B chooses linearly independent random vectors
and then generates CRS by defining
2 )(g
Then, g, u , u 1 , v 1 , · · · , u m , v m are uniformly distributed in G, and h 1 and h 2 are uniformly distributed in g 1 = G 1 and g 2 = G 2 , respectively, so that the distribution of CRS is identical to the distribution of the real output of Setup algorithm. We note that B knows − → x 1 , − → x 2 , and − → x 3 so that he can construct π 1 , π 2 , π 3 , π t,1 , π t,2 and π t,3 .
KeyGen. Next, B generates the public key P K by choosing random integers b , c $ ← Z p and computing
. Then, the secret key g is g Sining Oracle. B receives inf o = b 1 · · · b m0 (actually m 0 is depending on each inf o, however, for notational convenience, we use notation m 0 instead of m inf o .) and a tuple req = (c m0+1 ,
= e(h 1 , θ i,1 )e(h 2 , θ i,2 ) and e(c i u
= e(h 1 , θ i,3 )e(h 2 , θ i,4 ). If these two equalities do not hold, then B aborts the protocol and outputs ⊥. If req passes the test, for each 3 , and θ i,4 can be written as the forms 1} and t i,1 , t i,2 , s i,1 , s i,2 , r i , r i ∈ Z p . We will show this in the lemma 5.
B first computes the Waters-signature (S 1 , S 2 ), and then computes the signer's output (K 1 , K 2 , K 3,1 , K 3,2 ). The simulation to compute the Waters-signature is similar to the proof of the original Waters' signature scheme [37] .
If K(M sg) = 0, B aborts and outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B chooses a random integer r ∈ Z p and B constructs (S 1 , S 2 ) as
This is equal to a Waters-signature on M sg = b 1 · · · b m with the randomnessr = r − a F (M sg) . More precisely,
Next, B constructs K 1 , K 2 , K 3,1 and K 3,2 by using S 1 and S 2 . Since K 2 = S 2 and K 3,i = h
The remaining part is to construct K 1 , which is quite technical. We know that 3 )
for i ∈ [m 0 + 1, m] as follows:
2 )r. Finally, B sends (K 1 , K 2 , K 3,1 , K 3,2 ) and outputs success and inf o.
Output. At the end of the interaction, for some inf o A outputs q pairs of a message and a signature such that all q messages are distinct and all tuples of inf o, message and signature pass the Verify algorithm. If q is strictly larger than q inf o , which is the number of signing queries issued by A for inf o, by the pigeonhole principle there would exist a pair of M sg and a signature (S * 1 , S * 2 ) such that A did not obtain them from B. We use M sg
Then, B outputs g 1 . When A fails to outputs q > q inf o distinct messages and their signature for the same common information inf o, B outputs ⊥.
Analysis. We need to argue two things. One is that the simulated transcript by B is indistinguishable from the real transcript in the view of A. The another one is that the success probability of B to output g ab is more than 8(m+1)q .
In the view of A, the whole simulated transcript is identical to the transcript in the real game. In Setup phase, each parameter is uniformly distributed in the suitable group. In the KeyGen phase, g = g 
whose distribution is identical to that of the real output of the signer. Therefore, the overall distribution is identical to that of the real game defined in Appendix A. Now, we argue that B's success probability is non-negligible whenever A's success probability to break the one-more unforgeability is non-negligible. First, we argue that B outputs g ab if B does not abort and A successfully breaks the one-more unforgeability. Second, we argue the overall success probability of B.
In Output phase, B receives (S *
where M sg
Apply a projection π t,1 in the both side of the above equality, and then use the commutative property of projections and e, so we obtain that
. 8 That is, we utilize the projecting property.
Let π 1 (S 2 ) = g r * 1 for some unknown r * ∈ Z p . (Since G 1 is a cyclic group of order p, we can always write
By little changing the above equality using the bilinear property of e, we obtain
, g 1 ) = 1 t .
Since e is a non-degenerate bilinear map,
= 1 so that
In the case that F (M sg * ) ≡ 0 ( mod p),
Therefore, from the above two equalities we obtain π 1 (S *
so that B outputs g ab . Next, we argue about the success probability of B. Since B sometimes aborts, it is not easy to calculate the success probability of B. The event that B does not abort, however, is only related to the case that K(M sg i ) = 1 for all i ∈ [1, q] and z + i∈ [1,m] m . This situation is identical to the simulation in the proof of the existentially unforgeability of Waters-signature [37] . Therefore, we follow Waters' approach to analyze the success probability of the simulation. First we describe a second simulator, which is easy to be analyzed and has the same success probability of simulator as that of the first simulation. We define a function
We can easily check that Γ (z , z 1 , · · · , z m , M sg 1 , · · · , M sg q , M sg * ) = 0 if and only if the simulator in the first simulation is not abort. Now, we describe the second simulation. In the second simulation the simulator, we assume that B 2 receives a DDH-tuple (g, g a , g b , g ab ) before starting simulation. Then, B 2 behaves as the real challenger in the one-more unforgeability game. That is, B 2 generates CRS in the setup phase, a signing key pair P K, SK in the KeyGen phase, answers signature signing queries by using SK. Let inf o i and M sg i be the common input string and the message used in Signing Oracle phase by A. We simply denote inf o i and M sg i as M sg i = inf o i M sg i . Let E succA be the event that A wins in the one-more unforgeability game, that is, A outputs q message and signature pairs passing Verify algorithm for the same inf o such that all messages are mutually distinct and q > q inf o , where q inf o is the number of issuing signing queries for inf o by A. At the end of interactions, the event E succA occurs with probability. If the event E succA occurs, then there exists at least one pair (M sg * , (S * 1 , S *
2 )) such that B 2 have not signed on the message M sg 
so that the probability of the simulation not aborting is at least
From the above two claims, we conclude that the success probability of B 1 is more than 8(m+1)q as follows:
) and e(c i u 3 and θ i,4 can be uniquely written as the forms
Proof. We can always write c i and d i by u 
Let G t,i,j be a prime order cyclic group e(G i , G j ). We already know that the image of e is equal to
,3 from the lemma 1. We first show that b i = 0 or b i = 1. Since
) should be the identity so that
)'s decomposition has a non-identity element in G t,3,3 so that the above equality cannot hold.) Therefore, after setting e(u bi i , v b i −1 i ) = 1 from the above equality we obtain an equality
The left side of the equality is contained in G t,1,1 ⊕ G t,1,2 ⊕ G t,1,3 and the right side of the equality is contained in G t,1,2 ⊕G t,2,2 ⊕G t,2,3 . Since G t,1,1 , G t,1,2 , G t,1,3 , G t,2,2 , and G t,2,3 are mutually disjoint subgroups (except the identity), e(h 1 , θ i,1 u
2 ) ti,2 = h ri 1 for some r i ∈ Z p , and hence
1 . Analogously, from the equality e(c i u
for some r i ∈ Z p . Since (b i = 0 or b i = 1) and (b i = 1 or b i = 0), we can be convinced that b i = b i ∈ {0, 1}. Further, θ i,1 , θ i,2 , θ i,3 , and θ i,4 can be written as the desired form.
Moreover, we can easily check that
Therefore, it implies that the uniqueness of b i , t i,1 , t i,2 , s i,1 , s i,2 , r i and r i .
To test a g's membership in G, we need to compute (n 2 − n)n 2 bilinear mapê and (n 2 − n)(n 2 − 1) multiplication in G t if we ignore the cost for computing the step 1 since it is respectively smaller than the cost for computing the step 2.
The above GMT is a perfect algorithm in the sense that it outputs without any errors. If we allow negligible errors, then we can improve the efficiency of GMT by using some batch verification technique. Basing on the k-linear assumption, we can further improve the efficiency of GMT. We relegate these improvements and the batch verification technique to Appendix E.
Subgroup Decision Assumption. The proposed bilinear group generator satisfies the subgroup decision assumption in generic group model when n = 2 and k = 1. We propose a new assumption which guarantees the subgroup decision assumption. We provide an evidence why we believe this new assumption is secure by showing that it holds in the generic group model.
Definition 12
Let G 1 be a bilinear group generator. Define distribution D b by
where 
We say that G 1 satisfies the assumption 1 in G if for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, Adv
We prove that G 1 satisfies the assumption 1 in the generic group model by applying the Boneh-BoyenGoh master theorem [9] , more precisely, its generalized version by Freeman [18] . Freeman gave the general definition of the independency and the master theorem using his definition of the independency as follows: 
We say that f · S is independent of (P, Q, R) if f · S is not dependent on (P, Q, R).
Definition 14 [18, Definition D.2] Let G 1 be a prime-order bilinear group generator, and let P, Q, R, f be as in Definition 13. Define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm A that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} in solving the (P, Q, R, f )-decision DiffieHellman problem in G to be
Theorem 7 [18, Theorem D.3] Let (P, Q, R) be as in Definition 13, let f ∈ Z p [X 1 , · · · , X n ], and let p be a prime. Let d = 2 · max{deg α : α ∈ P ∪ Q ∪ R ∪ {f }}. If f · Q is independent of (P, Q, R), then any algorithm that solves the (P, Q, R, f )-decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G with advantage 1/2 in a generic bilinear group of order p must take time at least Ω( p/d − n), asymptotically as p → ∞.
By applying the above definitions and the theorem to the assumption 1, we obtain the following theorem. 
R = {1} and f = {x 2 y}.
Then, the assumption 1 is equivalent to a (P, Q, R, f )-decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G. We will show that f ·Q is independent of (P, Q, R). By the theorem 7, this is sufficient to show that G 1 satisfies (P, Q, R, f )-decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G. To show the independency, first we observe the variable y. The variable y is used only for x 1 y in P and for x 2 y in f . We will show that f · Q is independent of (P , Q, R) where P = {x 1 y}. This is sufficient to show that f · Q is independent of (P, Q, R). We will check this independency step-by-step. First, we will compute all possible products between polynomials in {x 1 y, x 2 y} and in Q. For a set S of polynomials, we say S is independent if there is no non-trivial sum of polynomials in S to be equal to zero. Second, we will show that a set of the resulting polynomials (of the first step) is independent. A set S of all possible products between polynomials in {x 1 y, x 2 y} and in Q are as follows: Then, S = ∪ i∈ [2, 5] S i . It is easy to show that each S i is independent, so we omit details. Each polynomial in S i consists of only sum of monomials with degree i so that any summation of polynomials chosen from different S i cannot be equal to zero. Therefore, the independency of S i implies the independency of S so that we complete the proof for the independency of f · Q of (P, Q, R). Then, the distribution of the simulated transcript is identical to the distribution of the real transcript. Let us explain details. First, we consider about M h and M g . If we consider the exponent parts (that is, discrete logarithm based on g or h,) of elements generated by B, we can verify the following equalities. ), (
The variable y in the challenge ((g x1y , T b ), (g x1y , T b ) C ) is a independent from the adversarial view. If T b = g x2y , then the challenge ((g x1y , T b ), (g x1y , T b ) C ) = ((g x1 , g x2 ), (g x1 , g x2 ) C ) y , and thus the challenge is uniformly distributed in G 1 . Otherwise, T b is uniformly distributed in G, and then the challenge is uniformly distributed in G. Therefore, B can determine b with the same advantage of A.
E Other Group Membership Tests
E.1 Batch Group Membership Test
Given g 1 , · · · , g m , we describe Batch Group Membership Test (BGMT).
1. If g 1 , · · · , g m ∈ G n 2 , then go to the next step. Otherwise, output 0.
Let g i = g
Γi , where Γ i = (α i11 , · · · , α inn ). Choose random integers r 1 , · · · , r m , s 1 , · · · , s n 2 −n ∈ Z p . 
Test
